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CALLING GOD "FATHER" 
A THEOLINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 
Donald D. Hook and Alvin F. Kimel, Jr. 
This essay explores the significance and implications of the causal theory of 
reference for the current debate on the necessity and exchangeability of the 
divine title 'Father' in the discourse of the Church. Identifying 'Father' as a 
vocative term historically grounded in the speech of Jesus and his Apostles, 
the authors assert that it successfully refers to God, functioning very much 
like a proper name. They also identify linguistic barriers to its replacement 
by other terms. 
"Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name." With these words the 
Christ of the Gospels instructs his disciples to pray to the God of Israel. The 
prayer known as the Our Father or the Lord's Prayer unites all Christians, of 
whatever denominational stripe. Its ecumenical significance cannot be gainsaid, 
for it canonically authorizes the Church's liturgical prayer to the deity as Father. 
But what are we doing when we call on God as 'Father'? Given the current 
debate on theological language and the appropriateness or inappropriateness 
of masculine language for God, it is important that the status of 'Father' as 
a form of address to the deity be clearly understood. Is it metaphor, literal 
speech, or perhaps something else? An accurate answer to this question is 
necessary to any discussion of the significance of Father-language within the 
discourse and prayer of the Church. 
In this paper we demonstrate that the divine title 'Father' is a vocative and 
designating term that functions like a proper name in its unique referentiality. 
It consequently possesses privileged and foundational status within Christian 
discourse. 
Description of Vocative Case and its Use 
Vocative most often refers to a grammatical case marking a noun by a change 
in morphology and is used to denote one or more persons or things to whom 
the sentence is directed. English, like most of the modern members of the 
Indo-European language family, has lost its morphologically marked vocative 
but has retained syntactically the force of the case. It is marked entirely by 
syntactic changes and characterized phonetically. 
The purpose of vocative address is to capture the attention of the addressee 
-a "call" (as in [1] below)-or, less forcefully, to express the speaker's 
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relationship to the addressee-sometimes designated an "address" (as in [2] 
below). These two functions may coincide in a given utterance and therefore 
are not to be construed as mutually exclusive. 
(1) 0 LORD, open thou our lips. (Book of Common Prayer, 42) 
(2) Naomi her mother-in-law said to her, "MY DAUGHTER, I need to seek 
some security for you, so that it may be well with you." (Ruth 3:1) 
The vocative is set off visually in the clause by means of commas and 
paralinguistically modulated by a distinctive intonation pattern as a separate 
tone unit or as the tail, with a falling-rising intonation for an initial call 
vocative and a rising intonation for a vocative functioning as an address, both 
being characteristic of English. Other modulations may indicate 
astonishment, warning, annoyance, etc. Vocatives may appear in a sentence 
in initial, medial, or final position. 
The expressions (words, phrases) used vocatively in English are, beginning 
with the most frequent: 
(1) Proper names of all sorts: Simon Peter, Mary, James, Judas, Deborah, 
Yahweh. 
(2) Titles of occupation, status, and respect: Rabbi, Bishop, Professor, Doc-
tor, Waiter, Sir, Miss, Madam. 
(3) Kinship terms designating family relationships: Dad, Mom; Son, Daugh-
ter; diminutives, such as Daddy, Mommy. 
(4) Favorable and unfavorable epithets: friend, beloved, my love, fool, liar, 
hypocrite. 
(5) General nouns: man, ye Pharisees, children of God, you stupid table 
(speaker barked his shins on it).l 
Note the overall syntactic equality of these vocative expressions, i.e., titles 
= kinship terms = proper names. 
Reference and Proper Names 
John Lyons, in his important work Semantics, makes clear that one of the 
fundamental semantic functions of words is the naming process.2 Names of 
all sorts-but here we are thinking primarily of appellations-can be used 
both referentially3 (to assert something about somebody or something) and 
vocatively (in all the ways mentioned above). A proper name uniquely and rigidly 
designates a specific individual existent and is therefore to be distinguished from 
common nouns, which denominate specific classes of objects. Proper names are 
also to be distinguished from definite descriptions (singular noun phrases begin-
ning with the definite article, e.g., "the daughter of Pharaoh"), which denote 
whoever or whatever fits the description. Proper names are sometimes called 
rigid designators; definite descriptions flaccid designators.4 In English proper 
names are commonly capitalized and are used without determiners (i.e., defi-
nite and indefinite articles, demonstrative adjectives, etc.). 
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Just as there are immediately recognizable differences between proper 
names and common nouns, there is a different relation between a name and 
its bearer and between a common noun and that which the noun denotes. 
There is a long-standing theory of meaning in which one distinguishes be-
tween 'Fido':Fido, on the one hand, and 'dog':{Fido, Lassie, Spot, Rex, etc.}, 
on the other.s That is to say, a dog given the name 'Fido' and addressed by 
that name is assuredly that dog Fido, whereas 'dog', as a general term, will 
generate dogs of various names, including other Fidos. But with the name 
'Fido' we convey nothing more about the animal than his name. Because 
proper names have no meaning apart from their referents, they enjoy a fun-
damental arbitrariness. Proper names exclusively denote, whereas nouns and 
descriptive phrases both denote and signify.6 
This is not to deny that names may also carry connotative, emotive, and 
associative meanings. Within a specific family, for example, the name 'Fido' 
may well bring to mind a whole host of feelings and attitudes (good or bad) 
because of the prior experience of the family with a specific canine named 
Fido. Consequently, whenever family members hear this name, no matter if 
disconnected to the dog in question, these feelings and attitudes may be called 
forth. Similarly, identifying descriptions will in most cases accompany the 
use of a proper name, such that when a speaker is asked about the bearer of 
a proper name ("Which dog is Fido?"), he or she will respond with one or 
more descriptions. These descriptions, however, do not fix the reference of 
the name, unless the speaker deliberately employs them to do so.7 
We recall that 'Fido' refers uniquely to a specific dog by that name. But 
there are of course other dogs named Fido. Here it is helpful to clarify our 
reflection by the distinction between tokens and types.S The word 'Fido' may 
be construed as an abstract reality, a type, that we can neither see nor hear. 
The written and verbal instantiations of the type 'Fido' are known as tokens. 
The distinction that is being made here is analogous to the distinction made 
on other linguistic levels, for example, between phoneme/allophone and mor-
pheme/allomorph, where the second item of each pair is the realization or 
concrete example of the general and abstract phenomenon. When we state 
that 'Fido' refers uniquely and rigidly to a specific dog, we are speaking of 
'Fido' as token and not as type. Why does a given token 'Fido' denote the 
specific dog Fido and not all other Fidos? Because this dog has been histori-
cally named 'Fido' and this token has been accepted, communicated, and 
passed down by the surrounding community. Michael Devitt calls this causal 
network a "designating chain" (d-chain): proper names are grounded in their 
objects through dubbing, usage, and reference borrowing.9 For example, Je-
sus was formally given the Hebrew name Yeshua or Yehoshua (Gk. iesous, 
Lat. Jesus, Eng. Jesus) at his circumcision. This ceremony was witnessed by 
family and friends, who then passed on this name and its denotation to others, 
who themselves then gained both the ability to refer successfully to the son of 
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Mary and Joseph by the name 'Jesus' and the ability to "lend" to others the 
successful referential use of this word-so on and so on, down to the present. 
This causal network forms a d-chain that connects the user of the token 'Jesus' 
to the historical person Jesus, thus making possible effective designation. 
Once given and established, proper names refer independently of all de-
scriptive aptness, though they may in fact enjoy such aptness; e.g., Simon 
bar Jonah was given the Aramaic nickname Cephas ("rock": 'Peter' from the 
Greek and Latin) by Jesus because his faith was like a rock. In fact, a proper 
name may successfully refer even if the speaker holds descriptive beliefs 
about the object that are inaccurate or incorrect. 10 For example, even if Peter's 
faith never was like a rock, even if many of our beliefs about him tum out to be 
wrong, even if Jesus never actually bestowed upon Simon the name of Peter, the 
appellation may still be effectively employed to designate the Prince of the 
Apostles. Reference by personal names is independent of identifying knowl-
edge. What is crucial is the causal linking between name and object. 
Proper names, therefore, are unsubstitutable. I1 One cannot by induction 
determine a suitable and successful replacement for a given proper name; 
proper names have no synonyms. The present authors' names, for example, 
are Donald and Alvin, bestowed upon us by our parents. By these names (or 
by their diminutives, 'Don' and 'AI') we have been known all our lives; they 
denote us in our individual, personal existence. Whatever may have been the 
original reasons our parents chose these names for us, they now possess an 
arbitrary and given status. They simply are our names, and if a person wants 
to successfully address us, he or she had best get them right; it is unlikely 
we will respond to 'Bob', 'Benny', 'Harry', or 'Sam'. 
Of course, it is possible to give a new name or nickname to an individual but 
usually only with the consent of the individual and the surrounding linguistic 
community. It is also possible for an individual to choose a new name for himself. 
In either case, the new name functions not as a translational substitute for the 
earlier proper name but rather as an addition to it or replacement for it. 
Titles and Unique Reference 
We are all familiar with titles, though different cultures rely on the regular use 
of a wider variety than other cultures. Frequent titles include titles of occupation 
and status (Bishop, Professor, Doctor, Father [priest], etc.), as well as titles of 
privilege, attainment, and respect (Mr., Mrs., General, your Honor, Countess, 
etc.). We may define a title as follows: a title is a formal descriptive term given 
to a person or being setting him or her apart in some distinctive way. It may be 
used either as a noun phrase in the third person or as a vocative. 
Titles are different from proper names in several important respects. For 
one thing, the mere mention of any of the vocational titles above will call 
forth immediately a fairly clear idea of the work done by persons holding 
these designations. In short, titles contain descriptive content-though this 
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content can be minimal indeed (e.g., titles of privilege or respect)-whereas 
we have earlier indicated that proper names carry only referential meaning. 
Titles do, however, share one important feature with proper names: they can 
be employed to designate and refer to a specific individual. 12 In English, titles 
are routinely joined with names: Bishop Temple, Dr. Livingston, Senator Ken-
nedy, etc. But when a title is used alone, its referent is usually obvious, no matter 
whether the name has been mentioned earlier, the name is unknown, or the use 
of the title is playful. In the sentence "The President withdrew his nominee for 
the Supreme Court," the word 'President' unequivocally refers (given the proper 
context) to the individual who resides at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. As isolated 
lexemes the denotation of titles may be open, but when spoken in a given context 
they will often refer exclusively and unambiguously to a definite person. Exam-
ples of such uniquely referring titles are 'Chairman', 'King', 'Queen', 'Pope', 
'Messiah'. Note that, like proper names, these titles are capitalized in English. 
Referring titles constitute a class that, in the words of John Searle, "shades 
off into definite descriptions at one end and proper names at the other.,,13 
Like proper names, uniquely referring titles are typically connected to their 
bearers by designating chains. The d-chain assures us of the title's referential 
validity, as well as its acceptability to the one so titled. At his inauguration 
Bill Clinton was formally installed as the President of the United States, an 
event witnessed by millions and legally authenticated. From that point on, he 
assumed the title of 'President' and is now addressed as 'Mr. President'. We 
may successfully use these titles to refer to the husband of Hillary because 
both we and the titles are connected to him through a causal network of 
reference. 'The President' and 'Mr. President' refer to him uniquely and 
rigidly. While the original conferral of a title ordinarily involves initiation 
into a new role-descriptive elements, in other words, may (and probably do) 
ground the initial naming-the subsequent designational use of the title does 
not require an identifying knowledge of the role. It does not require that the 
title-bearer uniquely fulfill, in the mind of the speaker, one or more defining 
characteristics. All that is necessary is that the succeeding speakers enter into 
the community of reference-borrowing. "Where both descriptivist and direct 
reference are available," William Alston writes, "and even where they are 
both employed, it is direct reference that determines the referent.,,14 
We are not denying that speakers may fix titular reference by descriptivist 
means-in a given utterance explicit descriptive backing may be in the 
speaker's mind-nor are we denying that if a speaker is asked, Why do you 
call Bill Clinton "Mr. President?" he or she will probably respond with a list 
of descriptions: Clinton won the November election, he was publicly inaugu-
rated in January, he delivered the 1993 State of the Union address, he lives 
in the White House, and so forth. But we are asserting that this knowledge 
is unnecessary for reference. Perhaps a person slept through the election and 
has no idea what a President of the United States does. He or she will still 
212 Faith and Philosophy 
be able to refer to Bill Clinton by the title 'President' and will still be able 
to engage him in conversation with its vocative form. Confirmation of the 
sufficiency of designating chains for titular reference is provided by the fact 
that, once established, a title can successfully designate its designatum even 
if it is inaccurate or conveys no actual attributive content. Consider, for 
instance, a confidence man who passes himself off to a community as a 
physician and is accorded the title 'Dr. Smith'. The title will refer, even 
though the definite description of medical doctor is incorrect. The coinci-
dence of title and description is usual but not referentially necessary. 
Are uniquely referring titles, like proper names, unsubstitutable? At first 
glance they would appear not to be. Conveying descriptive content, they are 
potentially replaceable by synonyms, and as we have seen, titular reference 
may in fact be secured descriptively in specific instances. But the matter is 
not as simple as this. Once connected to their bearers by designating chains, 
referring titles cease to be common nouns designating classes of objects and 
become something like pro~er names. They have grown capital letters, as P. 
F. Strawson pithily puts it. 5 Speakers can, of course, successfully replace 
uniquely referring titles, but more than the substitution of words is involved: 
one either plugs into the extant referential path or one creates a new path. 
Consider the example of a reporter who at a press conference addresses Bill 
Clinton as "Mr. Highest Officer" (the thesaurus listing 'highest officer' as a 
synonym for 'president'). In doing so, the reporter is "baptizing" the phrase 
and generating a new d-chain. The individual is free to do so, just as Mr. 
Clinton is free to acknowledge or not to acknowledge this form of address. 
The descriptive content of the new title is not irrelevant. Its synonymity will 
influence, if not determine, both its original choice and its acceptance by the 
community of speakers; but because of the title's semantic grounding in its 
bearer through the act of historical designation, subsequent speakers may now 
employ it to refer to its bearer independent of its cognitive meaning, as long 
as they intend to refer to the same object as those from whom they learned 
it. The institution of a synonymous title is therefore analogous to the bestowal 
of a new name upon an individual. 
Titles and Kinship Terms 
One of the most important categories of titles is that of kinship terms. There are 
thirteen basic kinship words in English, and some accompanying diminutives: 
father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, cousin, 
husband, wife, plus some modifying affixes and terms such as great-, grand-, 
step, half-, -in-law, first, second, third. These terms specify familial relationships 
between persons. Of these, only 'father', 'mother', 'uncle, aunt', and (regionally) 
'cousin', and their diminutives, are normally used vocatively alone or in con-
junction with a proper name, and it is rare that any but 'father' and 'mother' are 
used with frequency. 
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Countless examples show that kinship terms can behave like proper nouns, as 
evidenced by the absence of determiners and the capitalization of the first letter: 
"Where's Dad?" "Is Mother coming?" "I expect Uncle Bob to join us Sunday 
afternoon." This behavior is further confirmed by vocative use: "Mom, are you 
coming with me today?" "You didn't tell me about that, Father." In these exam-
ples the familial title expressly identifies and tags either the person spoken about 
or the hearer. These terms have in fact become uniquely referring titles. 
Kinship terms, therefore, may be considered as titles under proper third-per-
son conditions and always when used in the vocative form. 
When employed vocatively, kinship terms are spoken from within the fa-
milial relationship and thus tell us something about both the one speaking 
and the one to whom the communication is directed. "Mom, will you pick 
me up after school today?" From this utterance we know simultaneously that 
the one addressed exists in a maternal relationship with the speaker and that 
the speaker exists in a filial relationship with the addressee. In this respect 
kinship terms differ from proper names, which ordinarily have no descriptive 
or relational content. Kinship terms of address both denote and signify. 
Most kinship terms in English are overtly marked for either masculine or 
feminine gender. Gender refers to two or more subcategories within a gram-
matical form class (e.g., noun, pronoun, adjective) of a given language, and 
requiring agreement with other words. Gender is to be clearly distinguished 
from sex (though there is often a relationship between the two).16 Modern 
English employs natural or notional gender: nouns and pronouns, but not 
adjectives or verbs, are classified according to semantic distinctions, in par-
ticular, sexual distinctions. The gender of the word (masculine, feminine, or 
neuter) is generally determined by the sex, or lack of sex, of its referent. For 
most nouns gender is covert: the gender of the word is hidden until the 
referent is known. For example, in the sentence "The teacher lectured bril-
liantly on the bankruptcy of liberal Protestantism" the gender of 'teacher' is 
either masculine or feminine, depending on the sex of the teacher. Overt 
gender, on the other hand, occurs in the third-person singular pronouns and 
in words marked for specific gender-including kinship terms such as 'fa-
ther', 'mother', 'aunt', 'uncle'. The correlation between the sex of the indi-
vidual and the gender of the kinship term is direct and usual. 
Designating kinship terms, like uniquely referring titles, are typically con-
nected to their bearers by causal designating chains. They successfully des-
ignate the appropriate individuals because they can be historically traced (at 
least theoretically) through a process of naming back to their designata. This 
is especially apparent in the vocative use of kinship terms. When does the 
title 'Mom' become a successful vocatival and referring title within a given 
family? Is it not when the child (natural or adopted) begins to call upon his 
or her mother by this name? 
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"Father" as Uniquely Referring Divine Title 
'Father' is a term of kinship and familial relationship. The title describes a 
male animal in specific generative andlor parental relationship to a child or 
offspring. This is its customary, primary, and typical use-its literal use. 17 
When we speak literally, we mean what our words say. Linguistic meaning 
and speaker meaning coincide. 18 Consider, for example, the literal use of 
predicates in subject-predicate statement: "The man standing over there in 
the corner is my father." A property or relation conventionally signified by 
the term 'father' is attributed directly to the referent. Succinctly stated, literal 
speech is accustomed speech. 19 
'Father' may also be used metaphorically in any number of ways. As a 
mode of speech, metaphor involves the transference of a word or expression 
from its typical context to a different context.20 Linguistic meaning and 
speaker meaning thus diverge. We do not mean precisely what our words say; 
we mean both more and less. Metaphor invites the hearer to envisage its 
subject (tenor) in light of one or more conventional meanings (vehicle). It 
proposes an exemplar or model through which the subject might be rendered 
and its significant features understood. Metaphorical speech therefore retains 
the linguistic meaning(s) of a word. It is not the sense of the expression that 
changes but its referent. "Metaphor," explains Janet Martin Soskice, "is that 
figure of speech whereby we speak about one thing in terms which are seen 
to be suggestive of another.,,21 
When God is identified as Father, the model of fatherhood is proposed as 
a paradigm by which deity is to be interpreted. Because the mode of presen-
tation is metaphorical, such usage commits one to saying that God both is 
like and is not like a human father in specific ways. This "similarity" and 
"difference" is rhetorical and ontological: it is rhetorical, for a transfer of 
meaning is involved in the communication event; it is ontological, for the 
difference between uncreated and created reality is absolute, yet God conde-
scends in his mercy to identify himself by creaturely realities. By this meta-
phorical presentation biological sex and cultural stereotyping may be 
excluded from our understanding of deity. 
Some theorists prefer to call this use of 'Father' analogy rather than meta-
phor. They note the regularity and centrality of the title within the Christian 
tradition and suggest that the elements of surprise and dissonance, so char-
acteristic of metaphor, are absent in the churchly use of 'Father'. Metaphor 
and analogy, however, share a basic linguistic structure: both submit an ex-
emplar or model through and by which the underlying subject is to be known. 
Both direct the attention of the hearer to an imaginative paradigm.22 For 
purpose of this essay, therefore, metaphor and analogy will be treated as 
identical modes of speech. 
Throughout the New Testament and Christian tradition, 'Father' is com-
monly used to speak to and about the Creator. This usage undoubtedly origi-
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nates in the practice of Jesus and his Apostles, and has been passed on to 
succeeding generations of believers. Given the grounding of the Church's prayer 
and discourse in the historical converse between Jesus and the One he named 
Father, the vocative use of 'Father' must be deemed as foundational for all 
descriptive uses. Because Jesus, and we in him by the Spirit, address the deity 
as Father, we may in the third person speak about him as Father. Our knowledge 
of the trinitarian converse, however, is itself grounded in the biblical narrative 
about the triune God. The lex orandi, lex credendi runs both ways. 
'Father' specifically identifies and names the God of Jesus Christ. Like a 
proper name 'Father' denotes the referent in an exclusive manner; like a 
proper name it is capitalized and used without determiners; like a proper name 
it is historically given; like a proper name it is connected to its bearer by a 
causal network of reference. And as with all proper names, its vocative use 
assumes that the hearer, who in this case is God, will acknowledge the name 
as referring to himself; otherwise the communication will be unsuccessful. 
Those who wish to raise the objection that 'Father' is a title with primary 
denotative meaning referring to a male parent in Western and other societies 
(with various stereotypical associations of age, authority, care-giving), and 
therefore not a proper name, fail to recognize the basic sameness of modality 
when a noun phrase is used with designational intent. When 'Father', for 
instance, is spoken by Christians in the second person to address the deity, it 
is both a title and a name. Or perhaps more precisely, 'Father' is neither a 
personal name in a conventional sense, such as 'Mary', 'Joseph', or 'Jesus', 
nor a typical title in terms of occupation or rank; but it functions as both. The 
equation might be stated as designation qua name qua title--succinctly, a 
titular name. 
There are two notable differences between the divine title 'Father' and 
ordinary proper names: 
(1) 'Father' confers descriptive content, which is why the word is always 
translated rather than transliterated from language to language as the gospel 
moves into new cultures. When either Jesus or the Church describes God as 
Father, something about God is being stated-though always in a metaphori-
cal manner. This content, however, is ultimately determined by Christ in his 
life, death, and resurrection and not, finally, by ordinary experience of sinful 
human fatherhood. We do not first know God as fatherlike and then decide 
to call him Father. We begin with the historical naming, with Jesus' invocation 
of God as Father, and then inquire as to its meaning. This feature of the 
Father-title distinguishes it from other uniquely referring titles and brings it 
closer to the proper name side of the spectrum. Even if we do not know what 
'Father' means when we say the Lord's Prayer or when we refer to the first 
person of the Trinity, or even if what we think we know is wrong, we still 
exercise effective reference because our usage is causally grounded in the 
practice of Jesus and the apostolic Church. 
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The designational function of the divine title is logically prior to-and 
semantically independent of-its descriptive function. Strawson distin-
guishes between referring and ascriptive expressions.23 A referring expres-
sion fixes the reference to a specific someone or something; an ascriptive 
expression tells us about someone or something. Adapting Strawson's dis-
tinction, we may say that within Christian discourse the divine title of 'Father' 
is both a referring and ascriptive expression, but its direct referential use is 
ultimately independent of all descriptive purposes. In the case of human 
relationships the relational content of kinship terms reinforces their usage. A 
small child, for example, may learn the use of a parental title long before 
understanding the relationship; but the eventual comprehension of the rela-
tionship will in turn augment and undergird the appropriate use of the title?4 
In the case of divinity and the churchly use of 'Father', on the other hand, 
the authority of Christ operates in a decisive and unilateral manner: we name 
God 'Father' because, and only because, we are instructed to do so by the 
second person of the Holy Trinity. 
(2) The vocative use of 'Father' implicates the speaker in a filial relation-
ship with God. Jesus rightly names God 'Father' because he is himself the 
only-begotten Son (John 1: 18); the baptized dare to call upon God as Father 
because in Christ we have been adopted as his children by the Holy Spirit 
(Gal. 4:4-7). The personal employment of this language has a commissive, 
self-involving quality. To call on God as Father is to accept the blessings and 
responsibilities of being his children, as well as to acknowledge God's per-
sonal and gracious identity for us in Jesus Christ. The use of ordinary proper 
names does not normally involve the speaker in active, personal commitment. 
Given the designational and relational functions of 'Father', we contend 
that the title enjoys a privileged status within Christian discourse. It shares 
in the linguistic arbitrariness and givenness that all proper names enjoy. It 
rigidly denotes the God of Jesus Christ, and through the invocation of this 
name, the baptized enact their status as sons and daughters of God. Hence 
all proposals to abolish the practice of invoking God as Father are refuted. 
This holds even if 'Father', when applied to the deity, is metaphorical or 
analogical usage. It is quite appropriate to assert that the Church's paternal 
language for God is figurative, while simultaneously insisting on the unique 
referentiality of the divine title 'Father'. 
All deities are invoked by names, even if that name is only the name God. 
If 'Father' rightly denotes the God of Jesus, the intentional choice to evade 
this name suggests linguistically either that the object of worship is in fact 
different from the God normally worshipped by Christians or that the wor-
shipers have rejected their status as sons and daughters of God. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg has recently stated the first point in terms of the 
doctrine of the Holy Trinity. All of our language for God is inadequate to the 
CALLING GOD "FATHER" 217 
divine mystery, so it is appropriate that our symbolic and metaphorical lan-
guage be abundant and full. This language is external to deity and therefore 
exchangeable. Such is not the case, however, with the appellation 'Father', 
says Pannenberg. 'Father' was Jesus' only name for God, and because this 
proper naming occurs within the triune being of the Godhead, it enjoys 
eschatological finality. "Where the word 'Father' is replaced by something 
else," he concludes, "there can be no warrant an~more that we are talking 
about and addressing the same God as Jesus did." 5 
The latter point is illustrated by an episode of the television show "Family 
Ties." The episodes was devoted to Nick, the boyfriend of Malorie. He had 
been alienated from his father for many years, and his distance and anger 
were symbolized in his refusal to call his father 'Dad'. He insisted instead 
on calling him by his first name. At the end of the episode, father and son 
are finally reconciled, and for the first time in years the vocative 'Dad' crosses 
Nick's lips as he joyfully reclaims his filial status. Kinship terms of address 
are spoken from within the familial relationship and indeed characterize that 
relationship. Such language is usually avoided only when an individual has 
moved outside the affection and bonds of family. Those who have been 
adopted in baptism as children of God will rejoice in their filial relationship, 
and will rejoice even more so in the unspeakable privilege of naming the 
Creator of the universe "Abba, Father." 
"Mother" as Substitute for "Father" 
What about the possibility either of substituting 'Mother' for 'Father' or of 
alternating 'Mother' with 'Father'? Three objections may be raised on the 
basis of our theolinguistic analysis. 
First, 'Father', as we have seen, is causally connected to God through the 
historical person of Jesus Christ. It is a uniquely referring title related to 
divinity by the designating chain of dominical and apostolic practice. The 
Church has insisted emphatically that this naming is grounded in divine 
revelation and that the first person of the Trinity appropriately accepts this 
name as referring to himself. The designating chain moves not only from the 
present to a past revelation but also into the future. The Apostle Paul provides 
the two key biblical texts: 
When we cry, "Abba! Father!" it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our 
spirit that we are children of God. (Rom 8:15-16) 
And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our 
hearts, crying "Abba! Father!" (Gal 4:6) 
The Church's address of the deity as Father is grounded in the speech of the 
kingdom; the Spirit-filled assembly utters the invocation of the risen Christ. 
The referential competence of this discourse issues from an eschatological 
cord of nomination, a cord that begins in Bethlehem and ends in the Heavenly 
Banquet. 
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If we wish to invoke God or refer to him successfully, we rightly return to 
the ecclesial d-chain. It is the historical community of the Church that equips 
us to name God truly. New appellations for God can of course be created; 
but the question of warrant then becomes paramount. As Jerome Gellman has 
written, "For reference to be successful there really must be a path leading 
back to the object. It's not enough for the namer to believe there is.,,26 
Theoretically, the title 'Mother' could be substituted for 'Father', either by 
tying into the current Father-chain or by instituting a new referential path. 
The following questions would still have to be answered satisfactorily before 
the Church could authorize either option. Do we know that God accepts 
'Mother' as a vocatival substitute for 'Father'? If it is advanced that God is 
now inviting prayer to him/her as Mother, this claim would appear to require 
a new revelation for its justification, a revelation that would ground the new 
naming and from which would flow subsequent designation. If so, when, 
where and to whom did such revelation occur? Is such revelation probable 
in light of the eschatological finality of 'Father'? Considerations regarding 
content also appear at this point. Are the terms synonymous? If they are not 
(as we argue below), then judgment must be made as to their theological 
compati bility. 
Second, 'Mother' and 'Father' are mutually exclusive terms. They are 
overtly marked for feminine and masculine gender, respectively, and therefore 
should not be used in modern English to name the same object. To do so is 
to disrupt gender concord and confuse the hearer. The fact that, applied to 
the deity, the use of 'Mother' and 'Father' must be metaphorical in some 
sense-the Christian God is, after all, sexually transcendent-does not alter 
this more basic grammatical point: if "Father" properly designates the deity, 
then 'Mother' cannot logically do so-and vice versa. 
The gender opposition of the parental titles is grounded in their semantic 
unequivalence. Sexual duality and contrasting generative roles clearly estab-
lish their distinct signification. Neither can function as the other's synony-
mous substitute. As designating titles, 'Mother' and 'Father' always literally 
identify two separate individuals, female and male respectively. They are 
perhaps best described as antonyms. Antonyms are words that share one 
aspect of meaning but are opposite in another aspect of meaning. Theoreti-
cally, the frequency, distribution, and sense of a word never coincide to 
produce a genuine synonym, yet words can certainly share some aspect of 
meaning and be antonymic in another aspect; for example, 'little': 'big' and 
'small': 'large' share size but not degree or distribution. Antonyms fall gen-
erally into two categories-gradable and ungradable. Gradable antonyms 
may be considered as forming a spectrum. For example, 'hot' and 'cold' 
would specify the extremities of the hypernym 'temperature', with 
'warm'-'lukewarm'-'cool' in between.27 Ungradable antonyms eschew a 
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gradable spectrum, identifying their referents as belonging to one of two 
mutually exclusive but complementary subsets, e.g., 'male': 'female', 
'alive': 'dead', 'mother': 'father'. One important implication of ungradable 
antonymy is noted by Lyons: "The predication of either one of the pair 
implies the predication of the negation of the other.,,28 If a person is a mother, 
then she is not and cannot be a father; if a person is a father, then he is not 
and cannot be a mother.29 
One objection may be raised: Since the Christian use of 'Father' is figura-
tive, will not the antonymy of 'Mother' and 'Father' be overcome by the 
metaphorical extension of 'Mother' into religious discour.se? Can we not, in 
this manner, drain the two words of their specific creaturely-biological con-
tent and thus render them semantically equivalent and gender-neutralized? 
This objection, however, misconstrues figurative usage. Metaphor does not 
obliterate the conventional meaning of a word; it transfers the word to an 
unusual context, thereby resulting in the creative interanimation of ideas and 
the disclosure of the subject in a new light. Even when used metaphorically, 
'Mother' and 'Father' remain descriptively incompatible and antonymous. 
It is certainly true that metaphors can become ossified over time, achieving 
the status of dead metaphors. When this happens, we see a movement from 
metaphorical usage to literal usage. A new word is in fact created. Thus appeal 
is no longer made to a comparative model; now the word may be used literally 
in its own dictionary meaning. This is not, however, how 'Father' functions 
within Christian discourse. Even when the divine title is described by theo-
logians as a form of literal or proper speech, the analogical structure is 
retained in the invocation of the fatherhood model to describe divinity?O We 
would expect 'Mother' to function similarly in metaphorical extension. This 
is particularly the case given the dichotomous opposition of 'Father' and 
'Mother'. If one of a pair of antonyms underfoes semantic change, the other 
will most likely undergo a parallel change.3 'Hot' and 'cold', for instance, 
are antonyms that describe physical temperature. In figurative use this an-
tonymy continues: e.g., hot news (breaking news) versus cold news (old 
news). The structure of the semantic field plays an important role in semantic 
extension and change. The claim, therefore, that 'Mother' and 'Father' may be 
rendered descriptively identical must be rejected as implausible. The relation of 
antonymy is not so easily overcome. As Lyons observes, "[Blinary opposition is 
one of the most important principles governing the structure of languages.,,32 
Here we must advance a distinction between predicating and designating 
metaphors. Predicating metaphors are those typically presented in subject-
predicate form-for example, "God is my mother." Designating metaphors 
are those employed as uniquely referring titles-for example, "Father, send 
down your Spirit." As predicating metaphors, there is no linguistic reason 
why 'mother' (and related maternal imagery) could not complement 'father' 
(and related paternal imagery) in our modeling of deity. Because, however, 
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of their lexical antony my and gender opposition, both should not be used as 
titular names for the one God. To designate the deity-even metaphori-
cally-by both titles would inevitably introduce confusions of reference. This 
is particularly true in a religion like Christianity, where 'Father' already 
functions like a proper name for the God of Jesus Christ. 
Third, the feminine gender of 'Mother' disagrees both with the grammatical 
gender of the biblical deity and with the gender of the English word 'God' .33 
The development of these two points is beyond the range of this paper. 
Succinctly, the argument proceeds as follows: Within the narrative presenta-
tion of the Holy Scriptures, divinity is assigned masculine grammatical gen-
der (as opposed to sex), which governs the choice of names, titles, and 
pronouns for God. This narrative portrayals has so profoundly shaped English 
speech that the word 'God' has retained masculine gender (cf. 'Goddess'). When 
a story is told in English, it is necessary to assign a specific gender to each 
character; consequently, when the story of the God of Israel and Church is told, 
his gender is inevitably masculine, as evidenced by all scholarly English trans-
lations of the Scriptures. This narrative telling is constitutive for the worship and 
discourse of the Church and our theological identification of deity. 
While the grammatical gender of the biblical God does not inhibit the use 
of feminine metaphors and similes to describe his care and discipline of 
humanity, it does determine the choice of titles and kinship terms by which 
to designate him. The notional gender of modern English requires that the 
gender of vocative titles agree with the gender of their referent. We may speak 
figuratively of God as an eagle nurturing her young or as a mother-bear 
protecting her cubs; but we will name him 'Father', not 'Mother'. Our speech 
must be faithful both to the grammar of the biblical narrative and the grammar 
of the language in which we proclaim this narrative. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the debate of the past twenty years regarding the role and func-
tion of 'Father' in the Church's language for God, a crucial distinction has 
been overlooked: 'Father' is a designating title that functions like a proper 
name, both in vocative address and direct reference. Grounded in the practice 
of Jesus and the historic Church, it uniquely identifies the God of Israel. It 
therefore possesses privileged and foundational status within Christian dis-
course and is not easily replaced. As the Church continues to wrestle with 
the difficult questions of sexism and theological language, she must recognize 
that she has received a precious gift in the life and witness of Jesus Christ, 
a gift she may neither squander nor toss aside. 
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